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Survey of Ohio Law-1959
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
VALIDITY OF STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Since much of the effort of administrative officers and agencies
is directed toward the enforcement of regulations or rules adopted
by them, the validity of these regulations and rules is often chal-
lenged. Three cases reported during 1959 involved attacks of this
type.
Regulation 53 of the Board of Liquor Control prohibits gambling
in and upon the premises of any retail business authorized under per-
mits issued pursuant to the Liquor Control Act.' The Board sus-
pended a licensee's liquor permits because of the presence of a "pin-
ball machine" on the premises. The licensee challenged the authority
of the Board to issue the regulation, and the court of common pleas
sustained this challenge.2 The court of appeals3 reversed the order
of the common pleas court and held that there was authority to issue
the regulation under Title 43 of the Ohio Revised Code.
A board of health of a general health district in Hamilton County
adopted rules and regulations for the licensing and registration of
plumbers. A common pleas court decision reported during 1959,
held that the health board's action was valid under its implied pow-
ers.5 This position was sustained in substance by the court of ap-
peals, but the supreme court held that there being no express power
to license, none could be implied. The court relied upon the cele-
brated case of Matz v. J. L. Curtis Cartage Company,7 which held
that the General Assembly cannot delegate legislative power to an
administrative body. The inference from the majority opinion is that
there can be no implied power to license in an administrative agency.
The acts of an administrative officer or tribunal must be predi-
1. Omio Riv. CoDE ch. 4301.
2. Stickley v. Board of Liquor Control, 126 NB.2d 603 (Ohio C.P. 1954).
3. Stickley v. Board of Liquor Control, 155 NYE.2d 81 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
4. Presumably, this regulation was predicated upon the authority set forth in OHIo REV.
COD § 4301.03 (C), which states that regulations and orders may be issued providing in de-
tail for the conduct of any retail business authorized under permits issued by the Board, with
a view to insuring compliance with the liquor laws and the maintenance of public decency,
sobriety, and good order in any place licensed under its permits.
5. Wetterer v. Hamilton County Bd. of Health, 160 N.E.2d 728 (Ohio C.P. 1955).
6. Wetterer v. Hamilton County Bd. of Health, 167 Ohio St. 127, 146 N.E.2d 846 (1957).
Chief Justice Weygandt, in a dissenting opinion, expressed the view that there was implied
authority under the pertinent statutes to adopt the rules and regulations in question. Id. at
139, 146 N.E.2d at 853 (dissenting opinion).
7. 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 NB.2d 220 (1937). The majority opinion also relied very heavily
upon the analogous case of Brunner v. Rhodes, 95 Ohio App. 259, 119 NB.2d 105 (1953),
involving the problem of the implied power of a city board of health.
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cated upon a legislative enactment which defines the policy of the law
and contains sufficient criteria or standards to guide the administra-
tive branch in the exercise of the discretion vested in it. This is a basic
rule which applies to municipal ordinances.' A comprehensive zoning
ordinance of the city of Lyndhurst required that certain buildings
thereafter erected, remodeled, or altered must have "parking space
reasonably adequate for commercial vehicles necessary to carry on the
business of the occupants of the premises and for the normal volume
of car parking by persons coming to the premises on matters inci-
dental to the uses thereof."9  In issuing a writ of mandamus to grant
a building permit, the court of appeals held the criteria too vague and
insufficient to guide either the building inspector or the Board of
Zoning Appeals. The supreme court affirmed this decision and held
that the actual decision of the building inspector as to parking spaces
for the building in controversy was unlawful because it was based
upon the authority of the unconstitutional provision in the zoning
ordinance. 10
APPLICABILITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Three decisions reported in 1959 determined the applicability of
the Administrative Procedure Act" to three different state agencies.
Two of these decisions did not involve an unusual application of the
statute. The act itself defines "agency" to include the State Civil
Service Commission. 2 In denying a writ of mandamus to the relator,
a former state employee seeking restoration to his state agency posi-
tion, the supreme court held that the act does apply to that agency
and that the act provides "a plain and adequate remedy in the ordi-
nary course of the law.'13
The statutory definition of an agency in the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act does not mention the Director of Highways. Thus, the
holding in City of Lakewood v. Thormyer,'4 that the act does not
apply to a proceeding to relocate a highway, is correct. Such a hold-
ing emphasizes the limited scope of the act's application to state
agency action of a non-licensing nature.
8. State ex rel. Selected Properties, Inc. v. Gottfried, 163 Ohio St. 469, 127 N.E.2d 371(1955).
9. Lyndhurst, Ohio, Ordinance 4122, art. IV, § 1 (e), March 6, 1950.
10. State ex rel. Associated Land & Inv. Corp. v. City of Lyndhurst, 168 Ohio St. 289, 154
N.E.2d 435 (1958).
11. OHIO REV. CODE ch. 119.
12. OHIO REv. CODE § 119.01 (A).
13. State ex tel. Oliver v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 168 Ohio St. 445, 446, 155 N.E.2d 897,
898 (1959) (per curiam). The supreme court observed that the order was appealable under
OHIO REV. CODE § 119.12, but relator failed to prosecute such an appeal.
14. 154 N.E.2d 777 (Ohio C.P. 1958), afj'd, 157 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio Cr. App. 1959). The
court of appeals relied upon OHIO REv. CODE § 5521.01 and the reasons of the trial court
generally. See also discussion in Constitutional Law section, p. 360 infra.
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The third decision,15 while sound, is not so obvious and serves to
emphasize the all-indusive application of the definition of an
"agency" whenever any licensing function is involved. The definition
of an "agency"'" excludes the Superintendent of the Division of
Building and Loan Associations in his action in the rehabilitation or
liquidation of the business and property of building and loan associa-
tions. The refusal of the Superintendent to certify articles of incor-
poration of a proposed savings association to the Secretary of State
was held to be the refusal to issue a license within the meaning of the
Ohio Administrative Procedure Act,17 and the act was held to govern
this aspect of the officer's official conduct.' 8
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Special Statutory Review of Local Government Agencies
In 1957, the legislature enacted a statute which provides a right
of appeal to the courts from the final order, adjudication, or decision
of every administrative agency within any political subdivision of the
state.' This appeal is authorized in addition to any other specific
remedy of appeal provided by law. In State ex rel. 12501 Superior
Corporation v. City of East Cleveland,20 the court held that the ex-
istence of this new remedy results in the elimination of other methods
of judicial review which depend upon the lack of a clear remedy at
law, e.g., mandamus.
Review Under the Ohio .Administrative Procedure Act
Appeals by the Agency
As originally enacted, the Administrative Procedure Act was
silent on the matter of agency appeals, and the Ohio Supreme Court
held that there was no authority under the Ohio Constitution or the
15. Metropolitan Say. Ass'n v. Burdsall, 154 N..2d 754 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
16. OHIO REV. CODE 5 119.01(A).
17. OHIo REv. CODE 5 119.01 (B) defines "license" to include any license, permit, certificate,
commission, or charter issued by any agency. Thus, the issuance, denial, suspension, revoca-
tion, or cancellation of any license as described in paragraph (B) is the exercise of a licensing
function which brings any state agency within the purview of the Administrative Procedure
Act. See 1945 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. No. 523 at 675 (Ohio).
18. See a further discussion of this case under the heading of "Agency Appeals," infra.
19. Omo REv. CODE § 2506.01 (Supp. 1959). Chapter 2506 consists of four sections
which together provide ' complete procedure for an initial judicial review at the trial court
level, with normal appellate review of the final order, judgment, or determination of the trial
Court.
20. 158 N.E.2d 565 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959). The court of appeals refused to grant a writ
of mandamus on four grounds, one of which was the availability of an adequate remedy at
law by virtue of the Administrative Appeals Act. The court relied upon the analogous case
of State ex rel. Oliver v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 168 Ohio St. 445, 155 N.E.2d 897 (1959),
which held that the provision for judicial review set out in OrnO REV. CODE § 119.12 fur-
nished an adequate remedy at law, precluding the use of the writ of mandamus.
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statute for an agency to appeal a decision.21 This decision was con-
sistent with a previous holding that a local administrative body
(township board of zoning appeals), having no statutory standing to
appeal, could not appeal from a court decision reversing its revocation
of a building permit.2 2 The Administrative Procedure Act was
amended in 1953 to authorize an administrative agency to appeal
from a judgment of the court of common pleas rendered on an appeal
from the agency's decision. 23  After this amendment, the statute
stated that "such appeal by the agency shall be taken on questions of
law relating to the constitutionality, construction or interpretation of
statutes and rules and regulations of the agency .. 24
The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted this language as a re-
striction on the agency's right of appeal,2" and it may appeal only upon
questions of law relating to one of these enumerated matters. The
Superintendent of the Division of Building and Loan Associations
discovered that this limited right of appeal prevented him from ap-
pealing a common pleas court decision reversing his order as being
arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful because not supported by reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence.26 It is possible that a common
pleas court ruling which recites that an agency's decision is reversed
because not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence,
and is not "in accordance with law," is appealable by the agency. The
Board of Liquor Control was permitted to appeal from such a ruling
when an examination of the court's opinion indicated that its action
was based in part upon a construction of two sections of the Ohio
Revised Code.2 7
Jenue for Appeals to Common Pleas Court
The Ohio Administrative Procedure Act sets forth the venue for
judicial review of all agency action except for appeals from the De-
partment of Taxation. Orders relative to licensing may be appealed
21. Corn v. Board of Liquor Control, 160 Ohio St. 9, 113 N.E.2d 360 (1953).
22. DiCillo & Sons, Inc. v. Chester Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 158 Ohio St. 302, 109 N.X.2d
8 (1952).
23. 125 Ohio Laws 488 (1953).
24. OHIo REV. CODE § 119.12.
25. Katz v. Department of Liquor Control, 166 Ohio St. 229, 141 N.E.2d 294 (1957).
26. Metropolitan Say. Ass'n v. Burdsall, 154 N.E.2d 754 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958). The ap-
pellate court may also review the correctness of the judgment of the court of common pleas
upon its finding that the agency's order is not supported by any reliable, probative, and sub-
stantial evidence in the entire record, whenever the agency appeals on the statutory grounds
contained in OHIO REV. CODE § 119.12.
27. Schott v. Board of Liquor Control, 155 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958). Fortunately,
the trial court had written an opinion in this case. In the absence of an opinion, presumably
the existence or non-existence of a basis for appeal by the agency would be determined by the
court of appeals on a motion to dismiss by an examination of the record. In fact, the court of
appeals in the present case isolated the "question of law" discussed in the trial court's opinion
and determined that it involved a construction of OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4303.13, .14.
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to the court of the county in which the place of business is located or
the county in which the licensee is a resident. Licensing orders of the
Board of Liquor Control are appealable to the court in either the
county of residence, the county in which the business is located, or the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Licensing appeals of non-
residents who have no place of business in Ohio, non-licensing appeals
from the Board of Liquor Control, and appeals from all other kinds
of orders (other than licensing) go exclusively to the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Franklin County.28
A Cuyahoga County resident had applied for the restoration of
his limited medical license, previously revoked by the Ohio State
Medical Board. This application was denied, and the applicant ap-
pealed to the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, where his
appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The dismissal was
apparently based upon the theory that the provision for appeal to
the common pleas court of the county of his residence applies only to
a licensee, and not to a person who has been denied a license. The
Ohio Supreme Court held that Cuyahoga County was the proper
venue.29 Its opinion points out that the Ohio Revised Code contem-
plates an appeal from four specific types of adjudications, two of
which are concerned with persons who have never been licensed:
(1) those denied admission to an examination, and (2) those whose
applications for an initial license have been refused. The court did
not believe that the legislature intended to confine the right to ap-
peal to the "home" court to those who had been licensed previously.
Accordingly, a person adversely affected by any one of the four spe-
cific adjudications may appeal to his "home" common pleas court.
Nature of the Hearing on Judicial Review
The Administrative Procedure Act declares that in order to af-
firm an administrative order, the common pleas court must find that
upon all the evidence before the agency and whatever additional evi-
dence may be received by the court, the order is supported by reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.30
In Harlem Social Club, Incorporated v. Board of Liquor Con-
28. OHIo REv. CODE § 119.12 (Supp. 1959).
29. Welsh v. Ohio State Medical Bd., 168 Ohio St. 520, 156 N.E.2d 740 (1959) (per cur-jam). Apparently the principal argument of the Medical Board in support of the dismissal of
the appeal was that the appellant was not a "licensee" and, therefore, must appeal to the Frank-
lin County court. The relief sought by the appellant was not very dear, but it had to be either
for the issuance of a license or for the renewal of a previous one. Because of this vagueness, the
precise limits of this decision as a precedent cannot be determined. However, the interpreta-
tion of the statute adopted by the court permits the use of this favorable venue provision by any
person aggrieved by any one of the four specified types of administrative adjudication.
30. OHuo REV. CODE § 119.12.
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trol,3 1 an order of the Board of Liquor Control was based upon a
charge which alleged a violation of the Liquor Control Act" and the
Board's regulations. At the hearing, all of the evidence was directed
to a violation of a regulation, and the Board's finding was that the
allegations were well taken and supported by evidence. On appeal in
the common pleas court, the hearing was confined to that part of the
charge dealing with a violation of the regulation. The court held
that the order was not in accordance with law, and the Board ap-
pealed. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the common
pleas court for want of evidence insofar as the Board's finding was
predicated on a violation of the regulation, and sent the case back to
the common pleas court to determine whether that part of the order
charging and finding a violation of the statute was supported by the
necessary evidence required by the Administrative Procedure Act.33
Does an appellant from an agency order, because of his failure to
raise any objection at the administrative hearing, waive his right to
object to matters of evidence supporting the order on his appeal to
the court of common pleas? Stickley v. Board of Liquor Control4
held that since the appeal to the court is on fact and law, the court
hearing is a proceeding de novo for the purposes of this issue and the
appellant is free to raise every question of fact and law anew.
This decision seems sound. While the supreme court has indi-
cated that the hearing is not "de novo" for the purpose of making an
entirely new record, it has said that the reviewing court must read and
consider all the evidence offered by both sides and must appraise all
the evidence as to credibility of the witnesses, the probative character
of the evidence, and its weight.36 In this process, counsel should have
the opportunity of pointing out infirmities in the record made before
the agency, even though no objection was raised at the administrative
hearing.
31. 107 Ohio App. 95, 156 N.E.2d 863 (1958).
32. OHIO REV. CODE ch. 4301.
33. One of the objections to the appeal was that the order was not one appealable by the
agency, but the court of appeals stated that the record disclosed that matters had been consid-
ered which shaped the judgment and supported the right of the Board to appeal. Apparently,
the terms used in the charge referred to the statutory phase of the violation rather than to the
regulatory one. However, the hearing proceeded on the regulatory phase, but upon evidence
relating to the statutory phase (see syllabus by the court).
34. 155 N.E.2d 81 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (per curiam), reversing 126 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio
C.P. 1954).
35. The court of appeals cited Andrews v. Board of Liquor Control, 164 Ohio St. 275, 131
N.E.2d 390 (1955), for authority in support of the last sentence in its opinion: "The appeal
to the Common Pleas Court was on law and fact and therefore, the trial proceeded de novo."
Stickley v. Board of Liquor Control, 155 N.E.2d 81, 82 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956). This may be
making too much of the Andrews case as a precedent because the opinion of Judge Stewart
denied that the 1951 amendment of OHIO REV. CODE § 119.12 provided for a trial de novo,
but indicated that it provided for something beyond a mere review of law as was previously
held in Farrand v. State Medical Bd., 151 Ohio St. 222, 85 N.E.2d 113 (1949).
36. Andrews v. Board of Liquor Control, 164 Ohio St. 275, 131 N.E.2d 390 (1955).
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Rehearings
A motion for a rehearing before the common pleas court is di-
rected to the sound discretion of that court. A court of appeals held
that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for a rehear-
ing to a licensee whose permit had been revoked by the Board of
Liquor Control, in the instance of a request to submit "newly dis-
covered evidence" which was known to the licensee subsequent to the
Board's order, but eight months prior to the hearing of the appeal in
the common pleas court.3 7
Review of Factual Determinations
The Administrative Procedure Act states that on appeal, the court
may affirm the order of the agency complained of, if it finds, upon
consideration of the entire record and such additional evidence as it
has admitted, that the order is supported by reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence and is in accordance with law."' Whether the
issue is presented in review proceedings either in the common pleas
court or in the court of appeals, the overwhelming majority of deci-
sions result in judgments sustaining the action of the administrative
agency.39 It is difficult to find a case in which the common pleas
court has been reversed as a matter of law for its erroneous determi-
nation that an agency's order is supported by the proper degree of
proof.40
Power to Modify the Terms of the Agency's Order
A court of appeals has stated that it is only when the reviewing
court does not find that the order is supported by "reliable, proba-
tive, and substantial evidence" that the court has the power to con-
sider vacation, reversal, or modification of the order appealed from.4'
37. DiNardo v. Board of Liquor Control, 158 N.E.2d 899 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
38. Omo REv. CODE § 119.12.
39. All of the reported cases under the Administrative Procedure Act covered by this Survey
were in review of the actions of the Board of Liquor Control. Since judicial review of this
agency is exclusively in the courts of Franklin County, all of the cases reported are from its
courts. In the court of common pleas: Harger v. Board of Liquor Control, 157 N.E.2d 463
(Ohio C.P. 1957); Kempe v. Board of Liquor Control, 156 N.E.2d 344 (Ohio C.P. 1957);
Klingbeil v. Board of Liquor Control, 155 N.E.2d 525 (Ohio C.P. 1957); B.P.O. of Elks,
Cincinnati Lodge No. 5 v. Board of Liquor Control, 155 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio C.P. 1957);
Salvatore v. Board of Liquor Control, 156 NXE.2d 175 (Ohio C.P. 1955). In the Court of
Appeals for Franklin County, in affirmance of the common pleas court: Neal v. Board of
Liquor Control, 161 N.E.2d 513 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959); City Prods. Corp. v. Board of Liquor
Control, 156 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958); Cattaruza v. Board of Liquor Control, 156
NXE.2d 167 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958); Musical Bar, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 107 Ohio
App. 104, 155 N.E.2d 509 (1958); Harger v. Board of Liquor Control, 157 N.E.2d 465
(Ohio Ct. App. 1957); Kempe v. Board of Liquor Control, 156 N.E.2d 344 (Ohio Ct. App.
1957); Klingbeil v. Board of Liquor Control, 155 NXE.2d 527 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
40. Longona v. Board of Liquor Control, 154 N.E.2d 453 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
41. Board of Liquor Control v. Buckeye Lake Hotel Co., 159 N.E.2d 632 (Ohio Ct. App.
1958). The judgment of the court of appeals was that the order of the common pleas court
be reversed and that the order of the Board be affirmed.
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Thus, when it does find that there is adequate evidentiary support,
it has no power to change the order from a revocation to a suspen-
sion. It must affirm the order.42  Severity of a board's action does
not alone justify a modification of the order.
Appeals on Questions of Law
If an order is contrary to law, the reviewing court, under the
statute,45 may reverse, vacate, or modify the order or make such other
ruling as is in accordance with law. Thus, it can and should order
the issuance of a permit when the board has denied a permit to a
person who did not own a business at the time of application, but who
was the owner at the time of the hearing on the application.44
If the order of the agency is supported by adequate proof and is
in accordance with law, it will be affirmed. Thus, a finding of the
Board of Liquor Control that it had no jurisdiction to order the De-
partment of Liquor Control to make definite and certain its notice of
rejection of an application for renewal of a permit was proper, and
was affirmed.45
Review Under Individual Agency Statutes
During 1959, the matter of "ripeness" for judicial review con-
tinued to come before the courts under the judicial review provisions
of the amended Workmen's Compensation Act.4  Two prior com-
mon pleas court decisions had held that an appellant was not required
to obtain a decision by the Industrial Commission before appealing
the decision of a board of review.41 Another common pleas decision
reported during 1959 reached a different result in an analogous situ-
ation.48 It held that a ruling of the Administrator of the Bureau of
Workmen's Compensation disallowing a claim was not apliealable as
a decision of the Industrial Commission. The court's opinion indi-
cates that a fair construction of the judicial review section of the
code4" does not permit the reading of the word "Administrator" as
42. Henry's Cafe, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 158 N.E.2d 543 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
43. OHIO REV. CODE 5 119.12.
44. Schott v. Board of Liquor Control, 157 N.E.2d 752 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958). This de-
cision affirmed the judgment of the common pleas court ordering the issuance of the permit.
45. Joseph v. Board of Liquor Control, 161 N.E.2d 543 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
46. OHIo REV. CODE § 4123.519 (Supp. 1959). For a decision reported in 1959 concern-
ing applications for rehearing before the Industrial Commission under the old act (Ohio Re-
vised Code § 4123.51, repealed by 126 Ohio Laws 1015 (1955)), see State ex rel. Goins v.
Industrial Comm'n, 106 Ohio App. 544, 156 N.E.2d 155 (1958).
47. Harrison v. Scanlon, 147 N.E.2d 135 (Ohio C.P. 1958); Wine v. Summer & Co., 154
N.E.2d 674 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
48. Moore v. General Motors Corp., 154 N.E.2d 468 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
49. Omo REV. CODE § 4123.519 (Supp. 1959). The opinion of Judge Leach utilizes the
canon of noscitur a sociis as an aid in reaching the conclusion that the word "commission" as
used in this section does not refer to the administrator.
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the equivalent of the "commission." This common pleas court deci-
sion was affirmed in a court of appeals decision reported in 1958.0
The following quotation from that court's opinion appeared to settle
the matter of ripeness for judicial review of the decisions of both the
Administrator and a regional board of review under the terms of the
existing law:
The only authorization for an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas is
found in Section 4123.519 of the Revised Code which permits an appeal
from a decision of the Industrial Commission or from a Regional Board
under certain conditions.51
The 1959 session of the Ohio legislature appears to have clarified
this matter of ripeness by the enactment of an amendment to the ju-
dicial review section. In addition to the previously enumerated pro-
visions for judicial review, the following language has been added:
"... provided, however, that the claimant may take an appeal from
a decision of the administrator on application for reconsideration or
from a decision of a regional board."53
Thus, under the foregoing conditions, it is now unnecessary to ap-
peal to the Industrial Commission as a condition precedent to judicial
review in the common pleas court.
Until October 16, 1959, it was necessary to file a notice of inten-
tion to appeal to the court of common pleas and to request a rehear-
ing by the Board of Unemployment Compensation in order to lay a
jurisdictional basis for a subsequent appeal from the decision of the
Board on rehearing to the court of common pleas. 4 An appeal taken
from the original decision of the Board, by-passing the rehearing step,
was properly dismissed for want of jurisdiction. "5 An amendment,
effective October 16, 1959,"6 eliminated the need for the request for
a rehearing. The much simpler statutory provision now authorizes
an appeal to the court of common pleas within thirty days after notice
of the decision of the Board has been mailed to the parties. 7
The decision in Schlagheck v. Winterfeld s determined the scope
of statutory judicial review of an amendment of a township zoning
50. Moore v. General Motors Corp., 154 N.E.2d 98 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
51. Ibid. At the time of this decision, Ohio Revised Code § 4123.519 permitted an appeal
"from a decision of the regional board from which the commission has refused to permit an
appeal to the commission.: 127 Ohio Laws 900 (1957).
52. This amendment (128 Ohio Laws 470 (1959)) of OHIO REV. CODE 5 4123.519 (Supp.
1959) applies to all deisions of the administrator or of a regional board of review on its ef-
fective date (November 2, 1959), to all claims filed after the effective date, and to any action
pending in a court on the effective date of the act.
53. Omo REv. CODE § 4123.519 (Supp. 1959).
54. 127 Ohio aws 900 (1957).
55. Dilatush v. Board of Review, 107 Ohio App. 551, 160 NE.2d 309 (1959).
56. 128 Ohio aws 1130 (1959).
57. OHIO REV. CODE § 4141.28 (Supp. 1959).
58. 108 Ohio App. 299, 161 N.X.2d 498 (1958).
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ordinance adopted pursuant to the general township zoning statutes. 59
The court's opinion states that a board of township trustees exercises
a legislative function in adopting amendments and that the function
of the reviewing court is limited to the following matters: determina-
tion as to (1) whether the proceedings are in compliance with the
statutory requirements; (2) whether the ordinance is unreasonable
or unlawful; and (3) whether the legislative action taken has a rea-
sonable relationship to the exercise of the police power delegated by
statute to the board of township trustees.
Review Through an Action in Mandamus
The writ of mandamus is not a proper method of judicial review
whenever there is a plain and adequate remedy at law or through
equitable relief.60 Other important limitations on the use of the writ
have been indicated elsewhere. 6 Despite these prohibitions, man-
damus continues to be used extensively. Perhaps attorneys resort to
this procedure because they can avoid the delays incident to congested
dockets in the courts of common pleas. At least every reported case
of mandamus concerning administrative action was an original pro-
ceeding either in the court of appeals or the supreme court.
Out of ten reported cases of mandamus, only four were successful.
In one of these cases, a retired policeman established a "clear legal
right" to a retirement pension, and the supreme court ordered the
board of trustees to grant the pension.62  In State ex rel. Killeen
Realty Company v. City of East Cleveland,63 the supreme court af-
firmed a court of appeals order granting a variance under the city
zoning ordinances, and held that a denial of a building permit was an
abuse of discretion because of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance
under which the denial of variance was issued. In another successful
proceeding, the relator had been denied a building permit on the
59. OHio REV. CODE § 519.12 (Supp. 1959). This section was amended in 1957, eliminat-
ing the provision for an appeal. 127 Ohio Laws 363, 371 (1957). However, the court held
that this specific appeal was governed by the provisions of Ohio Revised Code § 519.12 prior
to its amendment, both as to manner and scope of the appeal. The court's opinion analogizes
the scope of review to that existing under OHIO REv. CODE § 119.11 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, which applies to state administrative rule making.
The court rejected an argument that this appeal was governed by OHIO REV. CODE
2506.01 (Supp. 1959). This raises the question whether a "legislative act," such as the adop-
tion of a zoning ordinance or of an amendment to such legislation, is a "final order, adjudica-
tion, or decision" within the meaning of § 2506.01.
60. OHIo REv. CODE 5 2731.05.
61. See the discussion in the opinion in Glass Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 162 Ohio St. 302,
123 N.E.2d 23 (1954), and the comment in Culp, Administrative Law & Procedure, Survey
of Ohio Law - 1955, 7 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 221, 224 (1956).
62. State ex rel. Bailey v. Board of Trustees of Toledo Police R. & P.F., 169 Ohio St. 1, 157
N.E.2d 317 (1959). See discussion in Municipal Corporations section, p. 406 infra.
63. 169 Ohio St. 375, 160 N.E.2d 1 (1959). See also discussion in Constitutional Law
section, p. 359 infra.
64. State ex rel. Dille Labs. Corp. v. Woditsch, 106 Ohio App. 541, 156 N.E.2d 164 (1958).
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ground that the city would probably acquire the premises under emi-
nent domain as a part of a highway relocation project. The writ was
granted because the refusal was an unauthorized interference with
the relator's rights of ownership. In the fourth case,65 the court of
appeals issued a mandamus to the Industrial Commission to accept
jurisdiction of a claim for benefits under the silicosis and occupational
disease provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 6  It was
apparent on the face of the relator's application that the one-year
statute of limitations for filing claims for silicosis had run before the
application was filed. However, there was uncontradicted evidence
in the record that the claim was filed within six months of diagnosis.
This established a dear legal right to have the claim considered.
There is no common basis which will explain the failure of the
relators to succeed in six reported decisions wherein the writ of man-
damus was denied or dismissed. Perhaps this lack of success can best
be characterized as a failure by the relators to sustain the burden of
proving that clear legal right which must be established to secure the
issuance of the writ. In State ex rel. Oliver v. State Civil Service
Commission67 the supreme court refused to issue the writ in order to
restore the relator to a state job because there was a plain and ade-
quate remedy under the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act. In an-
other case,68 a police lieutenant was unsuccessful in his effort to se-
cure admittance to a promotional civil service examination for the
position of captain in a city police department since he did not qualify
under the terms of the applicable statute.69 In State ex rel. Ronald
Incorporated v. City of Willoughby70 the relator failed to secure his
building permit because he had neglected to exhaust his administrative
remedy of appeal. He had omitted to seek review from the board
of zoning appeals of a decision by the city building inspector denying
him a permit. In State ex rel. Farley v. Board of Education7 1 the
relator-school teacher was unable to obtain a continuing contract of
employment because he did not meet the statutory prerequisites for
continuing service status under the Teacher's Tenure Act.72  In an-
other court of appeals case,73 the relator sought a writ of mandamus
to compel the issuance by the city of East Cleveland of an unrestricted
65. State ex rel. Maxwell v. Industrial Comm'n, 160 N.E.2d 346 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
See also discussion in Workmen's Compensation section, p. 456 infra.
66. OHIo REV. CODE § 4123.68.
67. 168 Ohio St. 445, 155 N.E.2d 897 (1959).
68. State ex rel. Boyes v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 169 Ohio St. 63, 157 N.E.2d 349 (1959).
69. OHIO REv. CODE § 143.34.
70. 170 Ohio St. 39, 161 N.E.2d 890 (1959).
71. 169 Ohio St. 388, 159 NXE.2d 747 (1959), affirming 156 N.E.2d 924 (Ohio Ct. App.
1958), relator having brought his original action in the court of appeals.
72. OMto REv. CODE ch. 3319.
73. State ex rel. 12501 Superior Corp. v. City of East Cleveland, 158 N.E.2d 565 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1959). See also discussion in Constitutional Law section, p. 359 infra.
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permit to operate an automatic laundry. Relator's action was unsuc-
cessful for two reasons: (1) he failed to show that the administrative
modification was either arbitrary and unreasonable, or contrary to
law, and (2) there was an adequate remedy at law under the Admin-
istrative Appeals Act.74 Finally, in State ex rel. Brummett v. Board
of Health,5 the relator failed to secure a renewal of his license to
operate a sanitary land fill, since he was unable to show that he had
complied with the Board's rules or that the failure to renew was
arbitrary.
Review Through an Action of Declaratory Judgment
Plaintiff, a vendor of newspapers, confections, and other items,
had operated a stand in the State Office Building in Columbus since
1933. In 1955, the Director of Public Works gave notice that plain-
tiff's lease would not be renewed, sent her a request to vacate, and in-
dicated his intention to give the canteen privileges to the Blind Com-
mission of Ohio. The director's order was based upon a construc-
tion of a 1941 statute.7 6 Plaintiff then filed an action for a declara-
tory judgment of her right to continue at the stand as long as she
complied with the reasonable regulations of the state and paid the
required rent. The court of common pleas rendered a judgment per-
manently enjoining the director from removing plaintiff or interfer-
ing with her right to operate a concession stand in the State Office
Building.77  In affirming the judgment, 78 a majority of the court of
appeals determined that under the statute, plaintiff had a right to re-
main, a right which the legislature alone could terminate.
The opportunities here presented for judicial review of adminis-
trative orders at any level of the administrative hierarchy should not
be overlooked. The Declaratory Judgment Act is very broad:
"Courts of record may declare rights, status, and other legal relations
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed . . . . , The su-
preme court has recognized that administrative action at the state
level can be reviewed under this statute and that such an action is not
a suit against the state when the purpose of the action is to declare
the legal rights of the plaintiff.8"
74. Omio REV. CODE ch. 2506 (Supp. 1959).
75. 109 Ohio App. 57, 160 N.E.2d 289 (1959).
76. OHIo REV. CODE § 5109.11.
77. Drugan v. Flaler, 139 N.E.2d 704 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
78. Drugan v. Flaler, 161 N.E.2d 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958). Judge Fess, in his dissenting
opinion, expressed the view that the only matter involved was that of an expired lease. He
would have granted plaintiff relief in part by holding that under the terms of the statute, the
director was not bound to refuse to renew her lease. Thus, the parties would be left to
negotiate a renewal of the lease. Id. at 789 (dissenting opinion).
79. OHIO REV. CODE § 2721.02.
80. American Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 152 Ohio St. 287, 89 N.E.2d 301 (1949).
Judge Taft was the lone dissenter. He argued that there was an equally adequate administra-
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APPELLATE PRACTICE RULINGS INVOLVING
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
In Buckeye Lake Hotel Company v. Board of Liquor Control,"1
the Board had appealed, but had not yet filed an assignment of er-
rors. When a motion to dismiss the appeal was made, the time for
filing such assignment had not expired. The motion was overruled
as premature since there was still time to file the assignment of
errors, and, thus, the court had no way of knowing whether the Board
would show a statutory basis for its appeal. In another court of ap-
peals case,"2 a mistake in the transcription of evidence had occurred,
which error the appellant had attempted to correct by the attachment
of an affidavit to the brief and assignment of errors. The court
granted a motion to strike the brief, but indicated that a proper ap-
plication could be filed authorizing amendment at bar by interlinea-
tion in accordance with the statute.8 3 Another decision permitted an
appellant to amend his brief to include an assignment of errors, which
had been inadvertently omitted. 4 The Board of Liquor Control in
another case moved to dismiss an appeal, since the brief filed did not
anywhere include the phraseology "assignment of errors." How-
ever, the brief did contain a part labeled "questions of law pre-
sented." The motion was overruled, and the court held that a label
is unnecessary so long as the assignments of error are clearly set
forth."5
A court of appeals case8 6 serves to emphasize the importance of
following a rule of general appellate practice in prosecuting an appeal
from the action of an administrative agency. Unless the transcript
of proceedings in the common pleas court is signed or allowed by the
trial judge, the transcript is not a "bill of exceptions," and the court
of appeals cannot pass upon the trial judge's factual conclusions be-
cause of the incompleteness of the record.
The Ohio Revised Code does not provide for appeal on questions
of law and fact in the review of a decision of the Board of Tax Ap-
peals.8 7 When an appellant from a decision of the Board designates
his appeal as being on questions of law and fact, the appellate court
tive remedy afforded by statute, and that an action for a declaratory judgment cannot be main-
tained when the plaintiff has another equally serviceable and speedy statutory remedy available
at the time. Id. at 299, 89 N.X.2d at 307 (dissenting opinion).
81. 154 NB.2d 646 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
82. Smith v. Board of Liquor Control, 160 N.E.2d 350 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
83. OHIo REV. CoDE § 2321.14.
84. Karun v. State, 159 N.X.2d 257 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
85. Neale v. Board of Liquor Control, 160 NB.2d 352 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
86. Cafe Tia Juana, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 160 NXE.2d 663 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
87. See Oulo REv. CODE § 2501.02, which states the ten statutory grounds for such an
appeal.
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will treat a motion to dismiss as a motion to reduce the appeal to an
appeal on questions of law only.
88
A notice of appeal to the court of appeals from the common pleas
court should be addressed to the journal entry. In a case in which the
notice erroneously referred to matters discussed in the trial court's
opinion, the court of appeals refused to dismiss the appeal on the mo-
tion of the Board of Liquor Control, and permitted the appellant to
amend the notice to correct the error.8 9
Corwin v. Board of Liquor Control9" presented an interesting
commentary on the venue provisions91 which localized judicial review
of the Board of Liquor Control in the Court of Common Pleas of
Franklin County. In the principal case, the controversial issue was
presented by the existence of a church located within 500 feet of the
permit location. Previously, in Codic v. Board of Liquor Control,92
the resident judges of the Franklin County Court of Appeals had held
that there was substantial probative evidence to support the denial of
a permit when the permit premises are to be operated within a distance
of 500 feet of a church. The appellate bench in the Corwin case
was made up of judges of other appellate districts sitting by designa-
tion in the Franklin County Court of Appeals. They all agreed that
they would have decided the issues presented by the Codic case differ-
ently had they been sitting in in their own judicial districts, and would
have certified their own decision as being in conflict with the Codic
decision. However, they were sitting by assignment in Franklin
County and were, therefore, members of that court. Thus, they could
not certify as a conflict their decision to affirm the denial of the
permit. 93
The 1959 amendment of the Administrative Procedure Act9 4 par-
88. Bless v. Bowers, 160 N.E.2d 663 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
89. Neal v. Board of Liquor Control, 106 Ohio App. 333, 154 N.E.2d 661 (1958).
90. 159 N.E.2d 369 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
91. OHIO REV. CODE § 119.12.
92. 98 Ohio App. 388, 129 N.E.2d 650 (1953).
93. Judge Younger, writing the opinion for the three judges sitting by designation, felt that
as members of the Court of Appeals of Franklin County, it was their duty to affirm the judg-
ment below. Since the record did not affirmatively show that the permit was rejected solely
on the ground that the permit premises were located within 500 feet of a church, the court
could not exercise its prerogative of re-determining a decision which it believes is clearly
erroneous. Corwin v. Board of Liquor Control, 159 N.E.2d 369, 372 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
However, as indicated by Judge Younger's opinion, it would be appropriate for a "for-
eign" bench sitting by assignment to redetermine a decision which it believed to be clearly
erroneous. Ibid.
An early 1960 decision of the supreme court eliminated any doubt which may have existed
concerning the merits of the judgment in the Codic case. In Corwin v. Board of Liquor Con-
trol, 170 Ohio St. 304, 164 N.E.2d 412 (1960), the supreme court reversed the judgment
of the court of appeals and remanded the cause to the Director of Liquor Control with in-
structions to issue the requested permit. The court examined the entire record and con-
cluded that the sole objection to the application was the church's opposition to the sale of
intoxicants and its authorities' belief that it is not "proper" to have a liquor establishment so
close to the church. This evidence was insufficient to support a denial of the requested per-
mit.
94. OHIO REV. CODE § 119.12 (Supp. 1959).
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